Archive for the 'Academia' Category

Page 3 of 5


A question for behavioural economists

How true is the old adage “easy come, easy go”?  More formally, is it fair to suggest that an individual’s marginal propensity to consume (MPC) — the share of an extra dollar of income that they would spend on consumption rather than save — depends on the origin of the income?  The traditional wisdom would suggest that:

MPC (fortuitous income) > MPC (hard-earned income)

Have there been any studies on this?  If so, have there been any studies that apply the results to the evolution of US inequality in income and consumption?


Gratuitous self-promotion

I’ve removed my research page from this site and properly updated my LSE site.


The short-long-run, the medium-long-run and the long-long-run

EC102 has once again finished for the year.  It occurs to me that my students (quite understandably) got a little confused about the timeframes over which various elements of macroeconomics occur.  I think the reason is that we use overlapping ideas of medium- and long-run timeframes.

In essense, there are four models that we use at an undergraduate level for thinking about aggregate demand and supply.  In increasing order of time-spans involved, they are:  Investment & Savings vs. Liquidity & Money (IS-LM),  Aggregate Supply – Aggregate Demand (AS-AD), Factor accumulation (Solow growth), and Endogenous Growth Theory.

It’s usually taught that following an exogenous shock, the IS-LM model reaches a new equilibrium very quickly (which means that the AD curve shifts very quickly), the goods market in the AS-AD world clears quite quickly and the economy returns to full-employment in “the long-run” once all firms have a chance to update their prices.

But when thinking about the Solow growth model of factor (i.e. capital) accumulation, we often refer to deviations from the steady-state being in the medium-run and that we reach the steady state in the long-run.  This is not the same “long-run” as in the AS-AD model.  The Solow growth model is a classical model, which among other things means that it assumes full employment all the time.  In other words, the medium-run in the world of Solow is longer than the long-run of AS-AD.  The Solow growth model is about shifting the steady-state of the AS-AD model.

Endogenous growth theory then does the same thing to the Solow growth model: endogenous growth is the shifting of the steady-state in a Solow framework.

What we end up with are three different ideas of the “long-run”:  one at business-cycle frequencies, one for catching up to industrialised nations and one for low-frequency stuff in the industrialised countries, or as I like to call them: the short-long-run, the medium-long-run and the long-long-run.


Counter-cyclical markups

One of the things that gets discussed in the currently-under-attack topic of DSGE models is that of counter-cyclical markups.  If the typical firm’s markup is counter-cyclical — that is, if it’s markup over marginal cost rises during a recession and falls during a boom — then both the magnitude and the duration of any given shock to the economy will be larger.

From the front page of the FT website this afternoon:

counter-cyclical profits

The article it’s referring to is here.


Negative productivity shocks are conceptually okay when applied idiosyncratically to labour

This is mostly a note to myself.

Way back in the dawn of the modern-macro era, the fresh-water Chicago kids came up with Real Business Cycle theory where they endogenised the labour supply and claimed that macro variation was explained by productivity shocks.

The salt-water gang then accepted the techniques of RBC but proposed a bunch of demand-side shocks instead.

The big criticism of productivity shocks has always been to ask how you can realistically get negative shocks to productivity.  Technological regress just doesn’t seem all that likely.

Now, models of credit cycles like Kiotaki (1998) show how a small and temporary negative shock to productivity can turn into a large and persistent downturn in the economy.  In short:  Credit constraints mean that some wealth remains in the hands of the unproductive instead of being lent to the productive sectors of the economy.  The share of wealth owned by the productive is therefore a factor in aggregate output.  A temporary negative shock to productivity keeps more of the wealth with the unproductive for production purposes and it takes time for the productive sector to accumulate it’s wealth back.  If some sort of physical capital (e.g. land) is used as collateral, the shock will also lower the price of the capital, thus decreasing the value of the collateral and so imposing tighter restrictions on credit.

But Kiyotaki’s model still requires some productive regress …

Looking at Aiyagari (1994) and Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-Rull (2003) today (lecture 3 by Michaelides in EC442), I realise that small negative productivity shocks are conceptually okay if they’re applied idiosyncratically (i.e. individually) to labour.

Let $$s_{t}$$ be your efficiency state in period $$t$$.  $$s$$ is a Markov process with transition matrix $$\Gamma_{ss}$$.  $$e\left(s\right)$$ is the efficiency of somebody in state $$s$$.  Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-Rull use this calibration, taken from the data:

State s=1 s=2 s=3 s=4
e(s) 1.00 3.15 9.78 1,061.00
Share of population 61.1% 22.35% 16.50% 0.05%

The transition matrix would be such that the population-shares for each state are stationary.

A household’s labour income is then given by $$e(s)wl$$.

A movement from s=3 to s=2, say, is therefore a negative labour productivity shock for the household.

The trick is to think of the efficiency states as job positions. Somebody moving from s=3 to s=1 is losing their job as an engineer and getting a job as an office cleaner.  They will probably increase $$l$$ to partially compensate for the lose in hourly wage ($$e\left(s\right)w$$).

Remember that in the (Neo/New) Classical models, there’s an assumption of zero unemployment.  However much you want to work, that’s how much you work.  [That might sound silly to a casual reader, but it's okay as a first approximation.  There are (i.e. search-and-matching) models out there that look at unemployment and can be fitted into this framework.]

If everybody is equally good at every job position (as we have here) and all the idiosyncratic shocks balance out so the population shares are constant, then – I believe – there shouldn’t be any change in observed aggregate productivity.

However, if you introduced imperfect transfer of ability across positions so that efficiency becomes $$e\left(s,\theta\left(s\right)\right)$$ where $$\theta\left(s\right)$$ is your private type per job position, then idiosyncratic shocks could therefore show up in aggregate numbers.

This is essentially an idea of mismatching.  A senior engineering job is destroyed and a draftsman job is created both in Detroit, while the opposite occurs in Washington state.  Since the engineer in Detroit can’t easily move to Washington, he takes the lower-productivity job and a sub-optimal person gets promoted in Washington.


Article Summary: Economics and Identity

You can access the published paper here and the unpublished technical appendices here.  The authors are George Akerlof [Ideas, Berkeley] and Rachel Kranton [Duke University].  The full reference is:

Akerlof, George A. and Kranton, Rachel E. “Economics and Identity.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000, 115(3), pp. 715-53.

The abstract:

This paper considers how identity, a person’s sense of self, affects economic outcomes.We incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior. In the utility function we propose, identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave. We then construct a simple game-theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions.The paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace, the economics of poverty and social exclusion, and the household division of labor. In each case, the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis.

I’m surprised that this paper was published in such a highly ranked economics journal.  Not because of a lack of quality in the paper, but because of it’s topic.  It reads like a sociology or psychology paper.  99% of the mathematics were banished to the unpublished appendices, while what made it in were the justifications by “real world” examples.  The summary is below the fold … Continue reading ‘Article Summary: Economics and Identity’


Is economics looking at itself?

Patricia Cowen recently wrote a piece for the New York Times:  “Ivory Tower Unswayed by Crashing Economy

The article contains precisely what you might expect from a title like that.  This snippet gives you the idea:

The financial crash happened very quickly while “things in academia change very, very slowly,” said David Card, a leading labor economist at the University of California, Berkeley. During the 1960s, he recalled, nearly all economists believed in what was known as the Phillips curve, which posited that unemployment and inflation were like the two ends of a seesaw: as one went up, the other went down. Then in the 1970s stagflation — high unemployment and high inflation — hit. But it took 10 years before academia let go of the Phillips curve.

James K. Galbraith, an economist at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, who has frequently been at odds with free marketers, said, “I don’t detect any change at all.” Academic economists are “like an ostrich with its head in the sand.”

“It’s business as usual,” he said. “I’m not conscious that there is a fundamental re-examination going on in journals.”

Unquestioning loyalty to a particular idea is what Robert J. Shiller, an economist at Yale, says is the reason the profession failed to foresee the financial collapse. He blames “groupthink,” the tendency to agree with the consensus. People don’t deviate from the conventional wisdom for fear they won’t be taken seriously, Mr. Shiller maintains. Wander too far and you find yourself on the fringe. The pattern is self-replicating. Graduate students who stray too far from the dominant theory and methods seriously reduce their chances of getting an academic job.

My reaction is to say “Yes.  And No.”  Here, for example, is a small list of prominent economists thinking about economics (the position is that author’s ranking according to ideas.repec.org):

There are plenty more. The point is that there is internal reflection occurring in economics, it’s just not at the level of the journals.  That’s for a simple enough reason – there is an average two-year lead time for getting an article in a journal.  You can pretty safely bet a dollar that the American Economic Review is planning a special on questioning the direction and methodology of economics.  Since it takes so long to get anything into journals, the discussion, where it is being made public at all, is occurring on the internet.  This is a reason to love blogs.

Another important point is that we are mostly talking about macroeconomics.  As I’ve mentioned previously, I pretty firmly believe that if you were to stop an average person on the street – hell, even an educated and well-read person – to ask them what economics is, they’d supply a list of topics that encompass Macroeconomics and Finance.

The swathes of stuff on microeconomics – contract theory, auction theory, all the stuff on game theory, behavioural economics – and all the stuff in development (90% of development economics for the last 10 years has been applied micro), not to mention the work in econometrics; none of that would get a mention.  The closest that the person on the street might get to recognising it would be to remember hearing about (or possibly reading) Freakonomics a couple of years ago.


Deriving the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) with Calvo pricing

The Phillips Curve is an empirical observation that inflation and unemployment seem to be inversely related; when one is high, the other tends to be low.  It was identified by William Phillips in a 1958 paper and very rapidly entered into economic theory, where it was thought of as a basic law of macroeconomics.  The 1970s produced two significant blows to the idea.  Theoretically, the Lucas critique convinced pretty much everyone that you could not make policy decisions based purely on historical data (i.e. without considering that people would adjust their expectations of the future when your policy was announced).  Empirically, the emergence of stagflation demonstrated that you could have both high inflation and high unemployment at the same time.

Modern Keynesian thought – on which the assumed efficacy of monetary policy rests – still proposes a short-run Phillips curve based on the idea that prices (or at least aggregate prices) are “sticky.”  The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) generally looks like this:

\pi_{t}=\beta E_{t}\left[\pi_{t+1}\right]+\kappa y_{t}

Where y_{t} is the (natural) log deviation – that is, the percentage deviation – of output from its long-run, full-employment trend and \beta and \kappa are parameters.  Notice that (unlike the original Phillips curve), it is forward looking.  There are criticisms of the NKPC, but they are mostly about how it is derived rather than its existence.

What follows is a derivation of the standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve using Calvo pricing, based on notes from Kevin Sheedy‘s EC522 at LSE.  I’m putting it after this vile “more” tag because it’s quite long and of no interest to 99% of the planet.

Continue reading ‘Deriving the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) with Calvo pricing’


LaTeX

I’ve installed the Latex for WordPress plugin, so now I can freak people out by writing stuff like this:

$$P_{it}^{\ast }=\left( \frac{\gamma }{\gamma -1}\right) ce^{s_{it}}$$


Not good

Uh oh.  This doesn’t look good at all.  I did Engineering for my undergrad, spent five years working in Computer Science and am now becoming an economist.

On the plus side (for me, at least), my wife studied Philosophy and Political Science in her undergrad, is now in Law school and speaks four-and-a-half languages.