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	<title>John Barrdear &#187; Likelihood Ratio</title>
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		<title>The likelihood-ratio threshold is the shadow price of statistical power</title>
		<link>http://barrdear.com/john/2009/11/09/the-likelihood-ratio-threshold-is-the-shadow-price-of-statistical-power/</link>
		<comments>http://barrdear.com/john/2009/11/09/the-likelihood-ratio-threshold-is-the-shadow-price-of-statistical-power/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2009 15:24:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>John Barrdear</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Academia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Epistemology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Likelihood Ratio]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Neyman-Pearson]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shalizi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[statistics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Testing]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://barrdear.com/john/?p=831</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Cosma Shalizi, an associate professor in statistics at Carnegie Mellon University, gives an interpretation of the likelihood-ratio threshold in an LR test: It&#8217;s the shadow price of statistical power: [...] Suppose we know the probability density of the noise p and that of the signal is q. The Neyman-Pearson lemma, as many though not all [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a title="Cosma Shalizi's university website" href="http://www.stat.cmu.edu/~cshalizi/" target="_blank">Cosma Shalizi</a>, an associate professor in statistics at Carnegie Mellon University, gives an interpretation of the likelihood-ratio threshold in an LR test:  It&#8217;s <a title="Cosma Shalizi:  The Shadow Price of Power" href="http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/weblog/630.html" target="_blank">the shadow price of statistical power</a>:</p>
<blockquote><p>[...]</p>
<p>Suppose we know the probability density of the noise <em>p</em> and that of the signal is <em>q</em>.  The Neyman-Pearson lemma, as many though not all schoolchildren know, says that then, among all tests off a given size <em>s</em>, the one with the smallest miss probability, or highest power, has the form &#8220;say &#8216;signal&#8217; if <em>q</em>(<em>x</em>)/<em>p</em>(<em>x</em>) &gt; <em>t</em>(<em>s</em>), otherwise say &#8216;noise&#8217;,&#8221; and that the threshold <em>t</em> varies inversely with <em>s</em>.  The quantity <em>q</em>(<em>x</em>)/<em>p</em>(<em>x</em>) is the <strong>likelihood ratio</strong>; the Neyman-Pearson lemma says that to maximize power, we should say &#8220;signal&#8221; if its sufficiently <em>more likely</em> than noise.</p>
<p>The likelihood ratio indicates how different the two distributions — the two <strong>hypotheses</strong> — are at <em>x</em>, the data-point we observed.  It makes sense that the outcome of the hypothesis test should depend on this sort of discrepancy between the hypotheses.  But why the <em>ratio</em>, rather than, say, the difference <em>q</em>(<em>x</em>) &#8211; <em>p</em>(<em>x</em>), or a signed squared difference, etc.?  Can we make this intuitive?</p>
<p>Start with the fact that we have an optimization problem under a constraint. Call the region where we proclaim &#8220;signal&#8221; <em>R</em>.  We want to maximize its probability when we are seeing a signal, <em>Q</em>(<em>R</em>), while constraining the false-alarm probability, <em>P</em>(<em>R</em>) = <em>s</em>.  <a href="http://dbpubs.stanford.edu:8091/%7Eklein/lagrange-multipliers.pdf">Lagrange</a> tells us that the way to do this is to minimize <em>Q</em>(<em>R</em>) &#8211; <em>t</em>[<em>P</em>(<em>R</em>) - <em>s</em>] over <em>R</em> and <em>t</em> jointly. So far the usual story; the next turn is usually &#8220;as you remember from the calculus of variations&#8230;&#8221;</p>
<p>Rather than actually doing math, let&#8217;s think like economists.  Picking the set <em>R</em> gives us a certain benefit, in the form of the power <em>Q</em>(<em>R</em>), and a cost, <em>t</em><em>P</em>(<em>R</em>). (The <em>ts</em> term is the same for all <em>R</em>.)  Economists, of course, tell us to equate <em>marginal</em> costs and benefits.  What is the marginal benefit of expanding <em>R</em> to include a small neighborhood around the point <em>x</em>?  Just, by the definition of &#8220;probability density&#8221;, <em>q</em>(<em>x</em>).  The marginal cost is likewise <em>t</em><em>p</em>(<em>x</em>).  We should include <em>x</em> in <em>R</em> if <em>q</em>(<em>x</em>) &gt; <em>t</em><em>p</em>(<em>x</em>), or <em>q</em>(<em>x</em>)/<em>p</em>(<em>x</em>) &gt; <em>t</em>.  The boundary of <em>R</em> is where marginal benefit equals marginal cost, and that is why we need the likelihood <em>ratio</em> and not the likelihood <em>difference</em>, or anything else.  (Except for a monotone transformation of the ratio, e.g. the log ratio.)  The likelihood ratio threshold <em>t</em> is, in fact, the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shadow_price">shadow price</a> of statistical power.</p></blockquote>
<p>It seems sensible to me.</p>
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